
















Summary The article aims at evaluating the municipal amalgamation process as a way 
of reforming local government, by two criteria – efficiency in service provision and level 
of democracy. Those issues are applied onto a finnish case study, as amalgamation is 
more common in Northern europe. The author gives a review of amalgamation studies in 
the world and of the extensive evaluation reports of amalgamation reform in finland. The 
paper examines amalgamation policy from two perspectives – from the instrumental or 
goal­oriented view and from the process aspect. The findings on the relatively high num­
ber of instances of amalgamation in finland are the following: the main process­driving 
factors were political parties that mostly supported the reform and the underlying urge 
to construct larger entities which made municipalities take part in the process. The level 
of efficiency in the new, amalgamated municipalities is not necessarily higher, as efficient 
service provision can be found both in small and large municipalities. efficiency is more 
determined by the dynamics of a municipal economy while the size of a municipality 
alone does not make a difference. As amalgamations change the nature of local political 
life they affect democracy both positively and negatively.
Keywords municipal amalgamation, municipality size, efficiency, level of democracy
Introduction
Municipal amalgamations belong to 
the toolbox of national governments 
both globally and in Europe. Municipal 
amalgamations are a means to make 
stronger municipalities, achieve econo-
mies of scale and rationalise the territo-
rial structure. Whether amalgamation is 
a good way to reach these targets is open 
for discussion. Besides the instrumental 
view it is important to look at the pro-
cess as well. Hence, the following ques-
tions are important to ask: what do typi-
cal amalgamation reform processes look 
like? What similarities and differences 
are there between countries? What do 
amalgamation reforms say about de-
mocracy? The following article discusses 
amalgamations in general, and through 
a case study of Finland in particular.
Finnish municipalities have broad 
duties and are in charge of the wellbeing 
of their citizens and provide a number of 
services (Pesonen and Riihinen, 2002). 
Finnish municipalities traditionally dif-
fered in size. However, they had similar 
obligations in principle. The number of 
























habitants) was high and the small mu-
nicipalities had two ways to cope with 
their size. First, they cooperated with 
other municipalities. Typically schools, 
health centres and hospitals were main-
tained in concert. Secondly, small mu-
nicipalities simply did not offer as broad 
a selection of services as the large mu-
nicipalities (Kettunen, 1999). This strat-
egy was also supported by the expecta-
tions of the citizens: they did not expect 
to find similar services in small and in 
large municipalities.
During the past decades a number of 
amalgamations took place, which mostly 
concerned small municipalities. These 
were voluntary and only in exceptional 
cases did the government make a deci-
sion to amalgamate without the consent 
of all the municipalities involved. In re-
cent years, however, the situation 
changed. In 2006, the national govern-
ment launched a municipal reform cam-
paign (Government Proposal, 155/2006) 
and proposed to parliament to increase 
the size of municipalities. The argument 
used in the debate and in the bill strong-
ly emphasised the scale issue: small mu-
nicipalities were said to suffer from a 
number of deficiencies. They were seen 
as economically vulnerable, and when 
small size and remoteness were com-
bined, their ability to take care of the 
wellbeing of the inhabitants was argued 
to be limited. Since the passing of the 
government bill, the pace of amalgama-
tion accelerated and the number of mu-
nicipalities decreased by one-fourth in 
less than ten years (Kettunen, 2008). 
Finnish municipal reform aims to create 
stronger municipalities. Strength, as 
such, can refer to a number of capabili-
ties including efficiency in service provi-
sion. Democracy is also one of the goals 
of the reform. Hence, there is a good 
reason to ask whether large municipali-
ties are indeed more efficient and more 
democratic than small ones.
This paper proceeds in the following 
manner: The second section presents 
some theoretical perspectives into amal-
gamation research. Thereafter, I will in-
vestigate Finnish municipalities and the 
background of amalgamations. Finnish 
municipalities are in charge of a wide 
scope of tasks and have a high degree of 
autonomy. Then will follow an in-depth 
analysis of the recent reform, which 
aims to diminish the number of muni-
cipalities. Next, I will investigate how 
successful the reform was. Prior to that 
there will follow a look at the reform 
process. Thereafter questions such as 
“Do amalgamations result in cost sav-
ings?” or “Are larger municipalities more 
or less democratic?” will be asked. In 
each case, both sides of the issue will be 
considered. Finally, I will discuss the re-
form from the viewpoint of relevance, 
that is, if larger municipalities are a solu-
tion to the problems diagnosed or the 
solutions lie somewhere else.
How to analyse municipal 
amalgamations
Municipal amalgamation is a pro-
cess which both the national govern-
ments and local governments can initi-
ate. The two options are usually referred 
to as voluntary and compulsory amalga-
mations. In both cases the reasons to 
amalgamate have to do with scale (more 
effective in providing services), cost sav-
ings (by cutting overlapping levels of 
administration) and achieving a higher 
level of service quality (through increas-
 ed resources) (Dahl and Tufte, 1973). 
There is a clear distinction in terms 
of geography: amalgamations are more 
com mon in the north of Europe and 










North, municipalities tend to have more 
tasks and, hence, in case of top-down 
amalgamations the state has more inter-
est in creating a territorial structure 
where municipalities have sufficient ca-
pabilities (Kuhlmann and Wollmann, 
2014). Furthermore, they (ibid., 169-
171) argue that in Northern European 
countries parliaments have constitution-
al and political power to enforce the ter-
ritorial structure of local governments 
envisaged through binding legislation. 
This parliamentary decision-making 
power harks back to the institutional 
history and the political culture of the 
multi-level system of these countries. In 
these countries the local government 
was assigned a crucial role in the local 
realization of the national welfare and 
intervention state. In contrast, the conti-
nuity and persistence of the territorial 
structure of local governments in South-
ern European countries can be largely 
accounted for by the path-dependent 
constitutional, political and political-cul - 
tural assumption that territorial changes 
by way of amalgamating existing munic-
ipalities can be achieved only with the 
consent of the affected local governmen-
tal units and their population.
Whether amalgamations result in 
improved democracy or increased effi-
ciency has been the main focus of mu-
nicipal amalgamation studies (Blom-
Hansen et al., 2012; Byrnes and Dollery, 
2002; Christoffersen and Larsen, 2007; 
Drechsler, 2013). Amalgamation re-
forms are most often analysed using an 
instrumental or goal-oriented approach, 
asking if amalgamation is a good way to 
reach such goals as scale benefits or bet-
ter service quality. Overall, the results 
are mixed. Aulich et al. (2011) state that 
it is clear that there is insufficient robust 
research to provide a sound basis for 
the assertion that economies of scale will 
generally accompany amalgamation. 
Dutch scholars conclude that “we find 
no evidence that amalgamations enable 
municipalities to better exploit econo-
mies of scale. Based on our results, we 
cannot recommend amalgamating mu-
nicipalities as an instrument to curb lo-
cal government spending” (Allers and 
Geertsema, 2012: 1).
The political decision-making pro-
cesses leading or not leading to amalga-
mations have been in focus much less 
often. This question concerns, in par-
ticular, the reforms initiated by national 
governments. When looking at the pro-
cess, the key questions concern the ac-
tors, their motivations and the strategies 
they apply. We assume that the political 
parties are key actors in municipal amal-
gamations, however, empirical data con-
cerning their behaviour is lacking in the 
literature. Additionally, actors such as 
bureaucrats, the business elite and inter-
est groups can play a role too. Municipal 
reforms can be analysed as political pro-
cesses. The issue is similar to the suc-
cessful implementation of any reform. 
The potential explanation of the imple-
mentation process deals with a host of 
factors. First, constitutions can simply 
allow the national government to modi-
fy the territorial structure. Secondly, in 
most of the national systems there are 
several political parties and their diver-
gent interests. Governments are political 
institutions and decisions usually con-
cern the interests of more than one par-
ty. Political parties are also represented 
at both the national and regional/local 
level of government. Thirdly, there are a 
number of additional key-actors – such 
as bureaucrats, interest groups and ex-
perts – that may directly or indirectly 
affect the process. It is important to ask 
what kind of interplay between these 
actors explains whether an amalgama-
























Amalgamation processes are seldom 
straight-forward. They usually create 
tension between the national and local 
level and divide the political parties. Po-
litical parties can, for example, estimate 
how specific reforms affect their sup-
porters and, thus, the election results in 
the future. Various interest groups, in-
cluding representatives of the local in-
habitants, may try to influence the out-
come of the process. Local inhabitants 
may resist an amalgamation but in some 
cases amalgamation is welcomed as it 
increases the size and visibility of a mu-
nicipality. The above mentioned actors 
are probably the key factors in determin-
ing whether an amalgamation takes 
place or not.
The basic characteristics  
of municipalities in Finland
Finnish municipalities have, like 
their Scandinavian counterparts, strong 
autonomy. This has been true especially 
since 1993-1995 when the municipali-
ties were granted even more autonomy. 
According to the Constitution of 1999 
(Section 121) “Finland is divided into 
municipalities, the administration of 
which shall be based on self-government 
by their inhabitants.” The same section 
also guarantees the right of municipali-
ties to levy taxes, but all further jurisdic-
tions concerning administration and the 
tasks of municipalities are stipulated at 
the level of ordinary legislation and not 
in the constitution (Pesonen and Riihin-
en, 2002: 191). Municipalities are auton-
omous, and they both decide policies of 
their own choosing and carry out the 
duties which national legislation pre-
scribes for them. The Municipal Admin-
istration Act of 1995 does not list any 
more specific municipal tasks, it only 
states very generally that “the munici-
pality strives to advance the wellbeing of 
its inhabitants and sustainable develop-
ment within its area.” Further state legis-
lation makes local governments respon-
sible for schools, hospitals, health cen-
tres and social welfare, and gives them 
responsibility for technical infrastruc-
ture and local planning (Pesonen and 
Riihinen, 2002: 192).
Municipal tasks are indeed compre-
hensive. According to the division of la-
bour, the state is in charge of national 
safety, taxation, pensions and labour 
policy. There are some shared tasks 
within the police force but municipali-
ties more or less take care of the welfare 
of their citizens. The Finnish politi-
co-administrative system is twofold, that 
is, there are only two levels of govern-
ment: the national and the local. There 
are regional actors too but these belong 
either to the state administration or are a 
part of the municipal organisation (Ket-
tunen, 2014). This differs from other 
Scandinavian countries where regions 
(landsting in Sweden, fylke in Norway) 
form separate levels of government and 
they are independent actors chosen in 
elections (Kettunen, 2008).
Municipalities provide a wide range 
of services for their inhabitants. Usually 
the services or tasks are divided into ob-
ligatory and voluntary tasks. Obligatory 
tasks are determined by legislation and 
municipalities are responsible for pro-
viding these services, for example, pri-
mary care, specialist care, dental care, 
childcare, welfare for the aged and the 
disabled and a wide range of other social 
services (www.kunnat.net). Although lo-
 cal governments vary in size, they all are 
responsible for arranging certain com-
pulsory services for their inhabitants. 
Often the legal obligation is expressed in 
vague, goal-oriented language, leaving 










their own specific way to meet the obli-
gation (Kettunen, 1999: 334). In some 
rare cases the inhabitants have a subjec-
tive right to demand certain services, 
such as childcare, afterschool care pro-
grammes and assistance for disabled 
persons.
Additionally to the obligatory and 
most costly operations and services, mu-
nicipalities provide a wide range of vol-
untary activities. Here the cultural ac-
tivities of municipalities deserve special 
men tion. Municipalities maintain librar-
ies and museums, several have perma-
nent symphony orchestras on their pay-
roll and many support permanent thea-
tres. Almost all municipalities provide 
sports facilities and other opportunities 
for recreation. Municipal services such 
as business premises and leasing servic-
es, water supply and sewage services and 
energy supply actually yield some reve-
nue above their operating costs (Peso-
nen and Riihinen, 2002: 195).
The local income tax paid by resi-
dents, the real estate tax and a share of 
the corporate tax account for almost half 
of all municipal revenues. Each local 
authority decides independently on its 
income tax rate. The average local tax 
rate is 19.17 per cent of taxable income 
(in 2010). Fees and charges account for 
about a quarter of municipal revenues. 
Most of the customer charges are col-
lected for services such as water supply, 
waste disposal, power supply and public 
transport. Just under one-tenth of social 
welfare and health expenditure is cov-
ered through customer and patient 
charges, while basic education is free.
The central government grants local 
authorities financial assistance in ex-
change for a wide range of statutory 
services. The central government trans-
fer system evens out financial inequali-
ties between local authorities and en-
sures equal access to services throughout 
the country. Central government trans-
fers account for less than one-fifth of all 
municipal revenues. In line with devel-
opments in other Nordic countries, there 
has been a shift towards block grants in 
Finland also. Some claim that the differ-
ences between the level and quality of 
services in municipalities increased and 
that block grants appear to have failed to 
guide the municipalities to take account 
of national targets or local spill-over ef-
fects (Oulasvirta, 2003: 346).
The municipalities have various ways 
of providing services. The principal mo-
des of providing services at the level of 
the local government are either in-house 
or purchased from another local govern-
ment, joint municipal authority, associa-
tion or from private companies (Kettu-
nen, 1999: 335). One challenge of mu-
nicipal services is to achieve functional 
cooperation between services provided 
by the municipality and those bought on 
the private market or from the third sec-
tor. The private service providers’ mar-
ket share is expected to increase, espe-
cially in services provided for the elderly 
and children and families, such as day-
care (child protection, foster care and 
professional treatment foster homes are 
private) (Niiranen, 2003: 328).
Many responsibilities of a local gov-
ernment exceed the capacity of single 
municipalities (Pesonen and Riihinen, 
2002: 192) and local authorities can pro-
vide services to residents in different 
ways. As local authorities cannot man-
age everything on their own, it often 
makes the most sense to provide services 
jointly with other local authorities, com-
munities and enterprises. Inter-munici-
pal cooperation is a common and tradi-
tional way of dealing with tasks which 
require a broad basis. Local authorities 
























to establish cooperation on a more per-
manent basis. Joint authorities typically 
provide education, social and health-
care services. Several local authorities 
can cooperate to establish a joint health 
centre or vocational schools. Joint au-
thorities include regional councils, which 
define regional policy, and hospital dis-
tricts, which are responsible for special-
ised medical care. 
To sum up, municipalities have 
broad obligations especially in the areas 
of education, social and health services. 
At the same time, municipalities are en-
couraged to find the best ways to provide 
services independently and to be flexi-
ble. This is also supported by the model 
of financing which relies mainly on tax 
income and does not earmark state sub-
sidies for particular purposes. The deci-
sions concerning the ways in which the 
legal service obligations are met are 
made by local politicians, municipal 
staff and their representatives. These de-
cisions are also affected by realities. If 
there are no private producers in the 
area, a rural municipality may only have 
a theoretical option of an alternative way 
of providing a service (Kettunen, 1999: 
339).
The way the state guides municipali-
ties changed. In the 1980s the guidance 
was strict but since the mid-1990s the 
opposite has been true. In other words, 
besides legislation, which is seldom 
bind ing in detail, the state authorities 
primarily distribute information and in 
that way aim to guide the municipalities. 
Since the late 1990s and the first decade 
of 2000, there have also been a number 
of government programs implemented 
in the areas of social and health policy. 
Thus it can be argued that the guidance 
is closer now when compared to the 
1990s (Kettunen, 2012).
Amalgamation policy
Starting from its national independ-
ence in 1917, the size of municipalities 
was always an issue on the political 
agenda throughout Finland’s history. 
Despite political efforts to set a mini-
mum size for local governments, only 
very few changes took place. A more 
radical wave of amalgamations, howev-
er, took place in the early 1970s as a reac-
tion to a government committee’s pro-
posal to cut the number of local govern-
ments. As Table 1 reveals, similar radical 
Table 1. The number of municipalities and the average number of inhabitants 
(years 1945-2011)


















changes have happened recently as well. 
In the last ten years about one-fourth of 
municipalities amalgamated with oth-
ers. Table 1 shows the changes in the 
number of municipalities.
In the last five years, half of the small 
municipalities which had less than 5000 
inhabitants amalgamated with others. 
The Finnish municipal structure is char-
acterised by small municipalities. This 
has long been considered a problem and 
several committees have proposed cuts 
in the number of municipalities (Kettu-
nen, 2008). The amalgamations realised 
so far occurred on a case-by-case basis 
and the decisions whether to amalgam-
ate or not were made by the municipali-
ties themselves, not by the national gov-
ernment.
However, in 2005 the national gov-
ernment came out with a new, much 
more radical proposal than before. The 
principal goal of the reform was to 
strengthen the municipal economy and 
improve the capacity of municipalities to 
provide services (Government Proposal, 
155/2006). Additionally, the aspect of 
equality was also included: larger mu-
nicipalities mean improved services for 
all inhabitants by diminishing the 
boundaries between affluent and poor 
municipalities. It was also maintained 
that municipal expenses would rise in 
the future due to the expanding elderly 
population and surging health costs. The 
key to solving these problems was seen 
in reducing the number of small and 
hence weak municipalities. As voluntary 
amalgamations had only marginally af-
fected the number of municipalities be-
fore 2005, the reform programme was 
launched to hasten the process (Kettu-
nen, 2008: 70-71; Government proposal, 
155/2006).
According to the 2005 reform pro-
gramme the municipalities were told to 
reorganise their social and health servic-
es if necessary so that they could serve a 
population of 20 000 or more. Munici-
palities were also obligated to rearrange 
vocational education too, but in this case 
the size of the population to be served 
was set at a minimum of 50 000. Amal-
gamations were not the only way to rear-
range services; municipal cooperation 
was encouraged as well. This was a com-
promise compared to the original re-
form plans of the government (Sand-
berg, 2010). Amalgamations were fa-
voured by the government, as it can be 
seen from the fact that state subsidies 
were paid to the amalgamation partners. 
Although municipal amalgamations were 
not compulsory, the implicit value of 
economies of scale was strengthened by 
binding state subsidies to a diminishing 
payment rate, that is, the faster munici-
palities joined together, the higher the 
subsidies. The grant was 1.8-fold if the 
merger became effective at the start of 
2008 or 2009 and 1.4-fold if the merger 
was carried out at the start of 2010 or 
2011. The law stated that 2013 would be 
the final year when compensations could 
be paid, which encouraged local govern-
ments to act quickly (Kettunen, 2008: 
73). The state subsidy system clearly 
played a role as the sums were consider-
able. Additionally, to make it easier for 
the municipalities to accept amalgama-
tions, staff working for the municipali-
ties was given a five-year immunity from 
redundancies.
The newly-enacted law started a pro-
cess whereby municipalities were re-
quired to submit plans to the Ministry of 
the Interior regarding how they planned 
to rearrange services by the end of Au-
gust 2007. This order resulted in a wave 
of negotiations between municipalities. 
The state did not guide the process so 
























turns. Negotiations did not always end 
in amalgamation and occasionally had 
to be restarted with a different group of 
municipalities. According to the legisla-
tion, the municipal inhabitants could be 
asked their opinion but this was only 
consultative, not binding. All participat-
ing municipalities (councils) had to agree 
on the details and sign an amalgamation 
plan. Thereafter began the lengthy pro-
cess of integrating practices. The differ-
ences could be trivial but they also re-
flected the deeper cultural differences of 
the municipalities. Finnish amalgama-
tions generally included two to ten mu-
nicipalities. Regarding joint organisation, 
the main issue was how the services were 
going to be reorganised. In the original 
formulation of the reform law, health 
services and social services closely relat-
ed to health were to be provided jointly. 
Several municipalities, however, found 
ways to continue as before and have the 
joint level only formally. Thus in 2011, 
the law was amended and according to 
the new formulation all social services 
had to be structured so as to serve 20 000 
or more inhabitants (Virkki et al., 2011).
In February 2012, the government 
presented a further reform plan (Kunta-
uudistus, 2012). The aim was to continue 
the reform and further diminish the 
number of municipalities. Although the 
number of municipalities declined, the 
increasing use of inter-municipal net-
works was criticized. These were consid-
ered to be undemocratic and organisa-
tionally unclear (Kuntauudistus, 2012). 
Undemocratic because the decisions were 
made by an inter-municipal organ, the 
members of which were usually nomi-
nated by the municipal assembly and 
not directly elected by the inhabitants. 
In other words, seen from the viewpoint 
of the local inhabitants the decision- 
makers were further away. Joint authori-
ties were also argued to be organisation-
ally unclear because inter-municipal or-
ganisations can have very different or-
ganisational designs which are not ne- 
cessarily transparent to local inhabitants 
(Kettunen and Teles, 2015). By March 
2015, at the advent of the parliamentary 
elections the amalgamation reform 
seemed to have paused for a moment.
Although the reform clearly had 
some drawbacks, its level of success 
needs to be investigated. At the begin-
ning of 2012, which was supposed to be 
the final year of the reform, the results of 
the re-structuring were mixed (Kettu-
nen and Sandberg, 2011). On the one 
hand, there were a record number of 
amalgamations with the year 2009 wit-
nessing an all-time high. At the begin-
ning of the reform, only a fourth of all 
municipal health centres met the popu-
lation criteria (20 000), whereas after the 
reform this was the minimum popula-
tion a health centre ought to be able to 
serve. However, larger cities were often 
unable to amalgamate with the sur-
rounding municipalities and thus, from 
the viewpoint of increasing the coordi-
nation capacity of municipalities, the 
changes are insufficient. Additionally, 
the high number of municipalities pre-
ferring cooperation instead of amalga-
mation was not welcomed by the re-
formers.
The reform did not involve all Finn-
ish municipalities. Firstly, the bigger 
ones (having already more than 20 000 
inhabitants) were not obliged to take 
action unless smaller neighbouring mu-
nicipalities joined them. Secondly, the 
law allowed remote archipelago munici-
palities and those having a considerable 
Swedish speaking minority to remain 
outside the reform. Finally, a number of 
municipalities simply refused to join the 










municipalities declined to 317 from 448 
in 2001.
Next, the analysis will focus on the 
amalgamated municipalities and the 
subsequent rise of the average size of a 
municipality. Afterwards, the paper will 
deal with the consequences of the mu-
nicipal reform. A particular emphasis is 
put on the issues of democracy and effi-
ciency.
Discussion
When summarising the analysis of 
the Finnish local government reform, 
one can put emphasis either on the pro-
cess or on the results of the reform. In 
the following the paper will deal with 
both aspects, beginning with process.
Process
The Finnish amalgamation reform 
was a largely top-down process. There 
were no compulsory amalgamations but 
the campaign was run by the Ministry of 
Finance and municipalities in general 
were unhappy with the process. We can 
clearly delineate the advocates and op-
ponents of the reform. Table 2 presents 
the groups.
Political parties are an interesting 
actor group. The Local Government Re-
form Act was widely supported in the 
parliament. In the 2011-2015 govern-
ment six, later four, government parties 
were strongly in favour of amalgama-
tions. Of the four in opposition, only 
two – the Centre, and the True Finns – 
were clearly against forcing the munici-
palities to merge. National level bureau-
crats were clearly for amalgamations. 
Their main argument was usually servic-
es and the problems caused by differenc-
es in local government economy, size 
and viability.
Local governments were divided. 
The 2006 reform was a sort of green light 
for a number of municipalities, mainly 
cities, to achieve their wish to grow. The 
number of inhabitants in a Finnish mu-
nicipality seems to signify higher status. 
For most of the municipalities it was not 
understandable why, for example, a well- 
working little health centre should be 
replaced by a complicated inter-munici-
pal cooperation. The scientific commu-
nity was divided as well. For some schol-
ars, an optimal size of municipality ex-
ists. For others, there is no such thing, 
the suitable size of a municipality is a 
contingent issue. Citizens preferred or 




Government parties Opposition parties
Political parties:
local level
Mostly parties in cities Mostly parties in urban areas
Bureaucrats:
national level
Ministries Urban vs. rural
Local governments Most cities Majority of municipalities

























rejected amalgamations based on their 
location.
The national government persuaded 
municipalities to amalgamate without 
using force. Sandberg (2013) compared 
the Danish and Finnish amalgamation 
reform and argues that there are some 
differences between them. In Denmark, 
the process was managed in a more top-
down fashion. The municipalities could 
choose the partner but not whether to 
join or not. Additionally, the municipal-
ities were given new tasks, which did not 
happen in Finland. Sandberg (2010) ex-
plains that in Finland the relatively high 
number of amalgamations can be ex-
plained by a number of factors. Firstly, 
the political parties which traditionally 
resisted anything suggesting obligatory 
amalgamations were silent and accepted 
the reform. Secondly, although inhabit-
ants, especially of small municipalities, 
generally resist amalgamations, amalga-
mations also provide benefits for local 
decision-makers and bureaucrats. Larger 
municipalities offer more lucrative posi-
tions for both of these groups. Thirdly, in 
many cases small, rural municipalities 
motivated by economic reasons simply 
searched for relief in the form of an 
amalgamation. Finally, Finnish munici-
palities are constitutionally protected. 
Hence, a brief explanation of the reform 
is that local governments had the right 
of making the final decision. In other 
words, the high number of amalgama-
tions reflected an underlying urge to 
construct larger entities and the merging 
municipalities gladly used the opportu-
nity. If such an urge was missing, the 
municipalities chose to cooperate with 
others or rejected the reform altogether.
Instrumental view
The second analytic question was if 
the municipal reform achieved its goals. 
Firstly, there were many goals and it 
would have been impossible to achieve 
all of them. The primary goal of the re-
form was to create stronger municipali-
ties which are able to provide high-qual-
ity services to citizens. Bigger does not 
necessarily mean stronger. Being a large-
scale reform it is not surprising that it 
was evaluated comprehensively. The main 
evaluation, entitled Arttu (www.kunnat.
net), has so far produced more than ten 
volumes of evaluation reports. Another 
piece of evaluation focused on social 
services (Virkki et al., 2011). Together 
these evaluations tried to shed a light on 
the consequences of the reform. As a 
programme, the municipal reform poses 
some challenges to a would-be evalua-
tor. Firstly, the goals of the reform are 
broad and they are not always followed 
by measures. Secondly, the reform is 
characterised by a complicated structure 
since the goals were set at the state level, 
while it was implemented at the local 
level. In other words, the question is if 
the aim of the program was to push the 
municipalities toward certain measures 
or rather to suggest a selection of meas-
ures. According to Kettunen and Sand-
berg (2011) the reform should be inter-
preted more as a dialogue rather than a 
centrally enforced reform process.
In the following part of the paper the 
municipal reform is analysed from three 
different perspectives: economies of scale, 
democracy and other consequences. The 
last perspective includes such conse-
quences as quality of services, visibility 
of municipality and transaction costs, 
which all can play a role when evaluating 
the overall success of a particular re-
form. The main goal of the reform was to 
strengthen the municipalities. The moti-
vation of the reform was to guarantee 
that municipalities can provide the wide 
range of services they are legally obliged 










that social and health services, a major 
responsibility of the local governments, 
should be made available for at least for 
20 000 inhabitants. To fulfil this obliga-
tion many municipalities joined inter- 
municipal networks.
Is size, however, the only factor in 
viability? To what extent is there evi-
dence for the scale argument? If scale is a 
decisive factor, we should be able to 
show that the larger a municipality, the 
better it functions in economic terms. 
First, it is important to clarify what mu-
nicipal economics is about. Municipali-
ties produce and provide a large number 
of services and this, more precisely the 
staff costs associated with the services, is 
the main expenditure in the municipal 
budget. Therefore, we could compare the 
efficiency of service provision in small 
and large municipalities and draw con-
clusions from our findings. This per-
spective would, however, be misleading 
as it is more focused on the services than 
on the municipality as such. In other 
words, both small and large municipali-
ties can provide services efficiently, if the 
provision of these services is well organ-
ized. Larger municipalities with a large 
territory often face the challenge of pro-
viding services to all inhabitants equally. 
On the other hand, large municipalities 
may be more successful in finding an 
optimal relationship between costs and 
services (school, health centre, etc.) 
compared to a small one. To sum up, we 
could probably find efficient service pro-
vision both in small and large munici-
palities.
The second point to discuss within 
the topic of economies of scale requires 
an analysis of the municipal economy. 
Vakkuri et al. (2010) argue that local 
governments are economic entities. 
View ed from the perspective of local 
economic conditions, large cities in the 
centre of the economic zone and the sur-
rounding densely populated, urban mu-
nicipalities are in the best position. Their 
population is growing and it is younger 
than the country’s average. Additionally, 
when compared to the municipality’s 
total population, the share of employed 
workforce is greater than the average. 
These municipalities have potentially 
good prospects for local economy. In 
contrast, the prospects for local econo-
my in a rural municipality are clearly 
less favourable (Vakkuri et al., 2010: 16). 
There are research findings which sug-
gest that both small and very large mu-
nicipalities can be ineffective. The small 
ones are inefficient because they have to 
provide services for a small number of 
inhabitants. The very large ones can also 
be inefficient because of a number of is-
sues, such as social problems typically 
concentrated in cities. In other words, a 
healthy economy is not directly depend-
ent on size.
Reviewing the economic prosperity 
of Finnish municipalities we can clearly 
see that both larger and smaller munici-
palities can be prosperous. Local author-
ities with a weak economy (Vakkuri et 
al., 2010: 16-17) typically have a negative 
annual income. Other problems include 
a high tax rate, accumulated budget defi-
cit and an increase in the amount of 
loans, which often makes it necessary 
to resort to discretionary government 
trans fers. It seems, however, that merg-
ers between financially weak local au-
thorities do not automatically result in a 
strong local authority with a balanced 
economy.
Finally, if large local governments are 
economically more successful, we should 
be able to observe this in the existing 
municipal structure, meaning that size 
and efficiency go hand in hand. This 
























(2010) who researched municipal econ-
omies using the concept of risk. Numer-
ous municipalities were characterised by 
a low tolerance of risk and large dynamic 
risks. These municipalities appear to 
be those which are losing population, 
whose population is ageing and whose 
future expectations are otherwise low. 
To conclude, municipal size and effi-
ciency do not go hand in hand; efficien-
cy is determined more by the dynamics 
of the municipal economy. Small munic-
ipalities may benefit from an amalgama-
tion but amalgamating weak municipal-
ities does not create a strong one, instead 
it gives temporary relief. Kallio et al., 
(2011) point out that during the first few 
years municipal mergers give rise to ad-
ditional expenses, while the benefits are 
realised gradually after a few years if the 
new municipality can take advantage of 
the productive potential associated with 
the merger. All in all, the studies on mu-
nicipal economies have by and large 
concluded that it is not size alone that 
makes a difference.
Another goal of the reform was to 
improve democracy. But how can a top-
down amalgamation reform improve 
democracy? The question of democracy 
and size of the municipality is a broad 
one. Most often the concept of local de-
mocracy refers to the relationship be-
tween the inhabitants and the local deci-
sion-makers (Burns et al., 1994). In this 
context, issues such as legitimacy, trust 
and participation are being discussed. 
Additionally, the question can be ap-
proached from the viewpoint of deci-
sion-makers. Are larger municipalities 
more difficult to manage, and is the 
power in these municipalities moving 
towards the bureaucrats and/or upwards 
to the state? Both of these aspects shall 
be discussed in the following discussion.
Starting with the question of partici-
pation and local inhabitants we can ask 
whether large municipalities are less 
democratic than small ones. There is no 
straightforward answer to the question. 
Small and large municipalities are some-
what different from each other. In small, 
rural municipalities it is easier for the 
inhabitants to contact politicians per-
sonally and be involved in the deci-
sion-making process. In larger, urban 
municipalities, however, the relationship 
between the politicians and the inhabit-
ants is more distant and measures such 
as demonstrations and writing in news-
papers are more common ways of con-
tacting politicians than being in person-
al contact. The inhabitants in small mu-
nicipalities generally feel that they have 
more influence on and trust in local 
politics than the inhabitants of large mu-
nicipalities (Pekola-Sjöblom, 2011). At 
the same time, small, rural municipali-
ties can be less open to various opinions 
than large ones. Sandberg (2010) points 
out that in about one hundred Finnish 
municipalities there is only one political 
party holding the majority of the seats in 
the council. Similarly, while there are on 
average 2-3 political groups present in 
small municipalities the number is 5-7 
in large ones.
Another important topic to consider 
is the one of local decision-makers. In 
large municipalities the councillors spend 
more time on political tasks than in 
small ones, there are more candidates in 
local elections and there are more politi-
cal groups. On the other hand, the coun-
cillors in small municipalities are per-
ceived to have more power (Pekola-Sjö-
blom, 2011). All in all, small, rural and 
large, urban municipalities differ in their 
political set-up, and both types have 
their strengths and weaknesses. In other 










amalgamations and the consequential 
growth of the size of municipalities en-
dangers or worsens democracy. Amalga-
mations change the nature of local polit-
ical life and there are risks that the for-
merly independent municipalities, now 
suburbs of the new municipality, and 
their inhabitants feel less powerful after 
the change. At the same time, new, larger 
municipalities may offer a different, 
more open basis for political life, and 
can thus improve democracy.
The final topic in our discussion on 
democracy concerns the reform process. 
The question is whether this sort of cen-
trally directed process that restricts the 
choices of local governments corre-
sponds to the autonomous position of 
municipalities. The evaluations of the 
municipal reform so far have not pro-
vided evidence on a change of democra-
cy in the amalgamation process. Instead, 
they provide tools and criteria to asses 
the changes. A plausible assumption is 
that amalgamations affect democracy 
both positively and negatively. The posi-
tive effects have to do with the diversifi-
cation of the political values in the larger 
municipalities. The negative effects have 
to do with the diminishing of the num-
ber of councillors and the losses having 
to do with the disappearing of munici-
palities as a basis of identity.
Thirdly it is important to ask wheth-
er amalgamation was a relevant way 
of tackling the underlying problem of 
the vulnerability of municipalities. The 
above delineation suggests that it was 
not. The economy of a local government 
rests on sufficient incomes and reasona-
ble expenditures. This is not a question 
of size. Reforms usually have both posi-
tive and negative side-effects as well 
(Vedung, 2000). Amalgamations de fac-
to mean that the average size of munici-
palities increases. This means that the 
practices of large municipalities are re-
placing the practices of small municipal-
ities. The new larger municipalities are 
not simply agglomerations of the former 
small municipalities but in many ways 
qualitatively different. Instead of a small 
staff and informal relationships the larg-
er municipalities rely more on formal 
procedures, electronic monitoring sys-
tems and more specialised approach to 
services (Virkki et al., 2011). The practi-
cal result of amalgamations is that civil 
servants of small municipalities are forc-
ed to adapt to the culture of large munic-
ipalities.
Conclusions
The municipal reform in its current 
phase is strongly based on the idea of 
economies of scale. Larger municipali-
ties are usually held to be more vibrant 
than small ones and it is presumed that 
they are able to coordinate services bet-
ter. These assumptions are only partially 
true. It is true that a large unit has a bet-
ter coordination capacity than a small 
unit. Larger units are also economically 
less vulnerable than smaller ones. The 
basic question, I would argue, is the eco-
nomic strength. This is where amalga-
mations provide poor results. In order to 
discuss this more in detail it is important 
to look at the dynamics of local govern-
ment costs and revenues.
Municipal revenues are based on 
taxes, subsidies and fees. Out of these 
the latter two are relatively fixed. The 
state subsidies are based on a number of 
indicators which the municipalities can-
not affect. Fees as a source of revenue 
have limits as well. This leaves taxes 
which, after all, are the most important 
source of revenue for the municipalities. 
Taxes are paid by both inhabitants and 
























shape these sources by economic policy, 
housing and by various services which 
could attract well-to-do people to the 
municipality. Larger municipalities can 
be more attractive to enterprises and 
taxpayers. They are more visible and 
large municipalities offer more public 
and private services. On the other hand, 
there are certain limits as well. Enter-
prises, in particular, are mainly influ-
enced by domestic and international 
markets and these cannot be manipulat-
ed very much by the municipalities. 
Municipalities can also do relatively lit-
tle to decrease costs. Municipal tasks are 
mainly affected by legislation and com-
pulsory tasks, and the comprehensive 
welfare services are often seen as some-
thing municipalities are not willing to 
cut. Health care is one of the tasks that 
significantly increases costs and it is not 
an easy area to find savings in. If the 
markets and demographic changes do 
not enable municipalities to collect a 
sufficient level of income, the only solu-
tion seems to be is to introduce some 
form of regional policy and a state-led 
policy of guaranteeing equal opportuni-
ties in the different parts of the country.
When it comes to democracy the 
conclusions are uncertain. Democracy 
was not a central goal of the reform ex-
cept for the aim of simplifying local 
structures and diminishing the role of 
joint authorities. There is, in this case 
too, an alternative way of looking at the 
question of democracy. The discussion 
needs to start at the Local Government 
Act of 1995, according to which munici-
palities are responsible for the wellbeing 
of their citizens. This does not only mean 
a responsibility for providing services 
but also a strategic approach to the well-
being of the inhabitants. This entails de-
cisions concerning the way social and 
health services are provided, the goals 
and emphases of welfare policy and oth-
er choices concerning the use of resourc-
es. Strategic thinking requires local dis-
cretion which the current reform does 
not emphasise. The current municipal 
reform has brought insecurity and tur-
bulence to the municipalities with the 
decisions on how to develop services 
coming from above.
Following Drechsler’s (2013) line of 
thinking, we can say that coercive mu-
nicipal amalgamations are not demo-
cratic, especially if the constitution 
speaks of autonomy. In the Finnish case 
the national government pointed out the 
weakness of small municipalities. This 
is, on the one hand, correct, on the other 
hand, smallness can be counter-bal-
anced by the means of inter-municipal 
cooperation or by the help of private 
providers. Finnish amalgamation re-
form is centred on the question of com-
pulsion. So far with very few exceptions 
amalgamations have been voluntary. 
Even with the precise demands for social 
and health care, amalgamation is not the 
only option available for the municipali-
ties. If this border-line is surpassed, the 
rules of the game change totally, which 











Allers, M. A., Geertsema, J. B. (2012) Do 
Municipal amalgamations affect Local 
Government Spending and Taxation? 
Evidence from the Netherlands. Public 
Choice Society Paper.
www.pubchoicesoc.org/papers_2012/
Allers-Geertsema.pdf (13. 12. 2013.)
Aulich, C. et al. (2011) Consolidation in 
Local Government: A Fresh Look. Vol-




web%28 1%29.pdf (17. 11. 2014.)
Burns, D., Hambleton, R., Hoggett, P. 
(1994) The Politics of Decentralisation. 
Revitalising Local Democracy. Hound-
mills: MacMillan.
Blom-Hansen, J., Christiansen, P. M., 
Fimreite, A. L., Selle, P. (2012) Reform 
Strategies Matter: Explaining the Per-
plexing Results of Regional Govern-
ment Reforms in Norway and Den-
mark. Local Government Studies 38 
(1): 71-90.
Byrnes, J., Dollery, B. (2002) Do Econo-
mies of Scale Exist in Australian Local 
Government? A Review of the Re-
search Evidence. Urban Policy and Re-
search 20 (4): 391-414.
Christoffersen, H., Larsen, K. B. (2007) 
Economies of Scale in Danish Muni-
cipalities: Expenditure Effects versus 
Qual ity Effects. Local Government 
Studies 33 (1): 77-95.
Dahl, R. A., Tufte, E. R. (1973) Size and 
Democracy. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
 sity Press.
Drechsler. W. (2013) Coercive Municipal 
Amalgamation Today: with Illustra-
tion from Estonia. Halduskultuur – 
Administrative Culture 14 (1): 158-165.
Kallio, O., Meklin, P., Tammi, J., Vakkuri, 
J. (2011) Rakennemuutoksen taloushy-
ötyjä odotellessa. Evaluation Research 
Program ARTTU Studies, nr. 17. Hel-
sinki: Association of Finnish Local and 
Regional Authorities.
Kettunen, P. (1999) Local-Government 
Services. Finnish Local Government 
Studies 27: 332-341.
Kettunen, P. (2008) Local Government 
Amalgamations. The Case of Finland. 
Journal of Regional Studies and Devel-
opment 17 (2): 63-81.
Kettunen, P. (2012) Implementing na-
tional policies at the local level: Imple-
mentation challenges. In: A. M. Bisses-
sar, ed., Problems in the Implementation 
of Government Policies in the West In-
dies: Essays on the Challenges Created 
by Cross-Border Jurisdictions. New 
York. Edwin Mellen Press: 293-318.
Kettunen, P. (2014) AER study on the 
state of regionalism in Europe (2014). 







Kettunen, P., Sandberg, S. (2011) Kom-
promissensprogramteori. En analys av 
den finländska kommun- och ser-
vicestrukturreformen. Nordisk Admin-
istrativ Tidskrift 88: 110-119.
Kettunen, P., Teles, F. (2015) Municipal 
cooperation: A Review of the Reasons 
and Results. Paper to be presented at 
the PSA 65th Annual International Con-
ference, Sheffield, 30th March to 1st of 
April, 2015.
Kuhlmann, S., Wollmann, H. (2014) In-
troduction to Comparative Public Ad-
ministration. Administrative Systems 

























Kuntauudistus (2012) The Government’s 
Municipal Reform. http://vm.fi/kunta-
uudistus (25. 1. 2015.)
Laesterä, E. (2010) Finanssiriskit Suomen 
kunnissa. Acta Universitatis Tamperen-
sis; 1494. Tampere: Tampere Universi-
ty Press.
Niiranen, V. (2003) Ensuring Municipal 
Welfare Services: A Modern Munici-
pal Challenge. Finnish Local Govern-
ment Studies 31: 326-331.
Oulasvirta, L. (2003) Local Government 
Finance and Grants in Finland. Finnish 
Local Government Studies 31: 340-348.
Pekola-Sjöblom, M. (2010) Kuntalaiset 
uudistuvissa kunnissa. Paras-Arttu- 
ohjelman tutkimuksia nro 9. Helsinki: 
Suomen Kuntaliitto.
Pesonen, P. Riihinen, O. (2002) Dynamic 
Finland. The Political System and the 
Welfare State. Helsinki: Finnish Litera-
ture Society.
Sandberg, S. (2010) Finnish power-shift: 
The defeat of the periphery? In: H. 
Baldersheim, L. E. Rose, eds., Territori-
al Choice. The Politics of Boundaries 
and Borders. Hampshire. Palgrave Mc-
Millan: 42-60.
Sandberg, S. (2013) Tio iakttagelser om-
kommunreformer i Danmark och 




pdf (7. 12. 2014.)
Vakkuri, J., Kallio, O., Tammi, J., Meklin, 
P., Helin, H. (2010) Matkalla kohti 
suuruuden ekonomiaa? Kunta- ja pai-
kallistalouden lähtökohdat Paras-hank-
keessa. Evaluation Research Program 
ARTTU Studies nr. 3. Helsinki: Associ-
ation of Finnish Local and Regional 
Authorities.
Vedung, E. (2000) Public Policy and Pro-
gram Evaluation. New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books.
Virkki, T., Vartiainen, A., Kettunen, P. 
Heinämäki, L. (2011) Sosiaalipalvelut 
muutoksessa. Kuntalaisten ja henkilö-
stön näkemyksiä Paras-uudistuksesta. 
Raportteja 56/2011. Helsinki: Tervey-
den- ja hyvinvoinnin laitos.
Reforma lokalne samouprave u Finskoj
SAŽeTAK Članak za cilj ima evaluaciju procesa spajanja lokalnih jedinica, jednog od na­
čina reformiranja lokalne vlasti, putem dva kriterija – prema efikasnosti u proizvodnji 
usluga i prema unaprjeđenju demokratičnosti. Navedeno se primjenjuje kroz studiju slu­
čaja finske, s obzirom da je spajanje lokalnih jedinica mnogo češće u Sjevernoj europi. 
Autor donosi pregled studija spajanja lokalnih jedinica u svijetu i opsežnih evaluacijskih 
izvještaja reforme u finskoj. Rad politiku spajanja lokalnih jedinica razmatra iz dvije per­
spektive – instrumentalne, one orijentirane na ciljeve reforme te iz procesnog aspekta. 
Nalazi o velikom broju slučajeva spajanja lokalnih jedinica u finskoj su sljedeći. Glavne 
faktore u procesnom aspektu čine političke stranke koje su većinom podržavale reformu 
te ishodišna potreba za stvaranjem većih entiteta zbog koje su lokalne jedinice iskoristile 
priliku. efikasnost nije nesumnjivo unaprijeđena, s obzirom da se efikasna proizvodnja 
usluga može pronaći i kod malih i kod velikih lokalnih jedinica. efikasnost je više odre­
đena dinamikom lokalne ekonomije, nego što isključivo veličina lokalne jedinice čini ra­
zliku. Također, spajanja lokalnih jedinica mijenjaju prirodu lokalnog političkog života, što 
ima i pozitivne i negativne efekte na razinu njihove demokratičnosti.
KLJUČNe RIJeČI spajanje (amalgamiranje) lokalnih jedinica, veličina lokalnih jedinica, efi­
kasnost, demokratičnost
